I. Political Philosophy as Science

Giambattista Vico (1664-1744), the author of a new science (Scienza Nuova 1725, 1744) at the beginning of an emerging capitalist economy in Europe’s Italian region, epistemologically separated the human sciences, or the study of societies, from the natural sciences. Since god is the maker of the natural worlds, he argued, in the final analysis only god can know the laws underlying their origin and purpose. And he concluded: since human beings created the worlds of societies, the laws underlying the nature of the social worlds can be ascertained by the makers of those worlds.

But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men/women, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since men/women made it, men/women could come to know.

With this reflection, Vico abandoned the study of nature. It was a strategic move for at least four reasons. It allowed him, first of all, to scale down his original research project, which consisted not only of a political philosophy, but also of a natural philosophy. As most leading philosophers
before him, and indeed, many after him, Vico embarked on his philosophical career by
inexorably connecting questions of ethics and epistemology to questions of ontology. By
abandoning the study of nature, he not only separated, however, the traditioned ontological
communalities of both nature and culture to which the majority of his philosophical predecessors
had adhered. By declaring priority and hence superiority to nature’s ontological principle, he also
delimited its relevance for the study of culture. Secondly, his strategic move allowed him to
distance himself from his earlier work on natural philosophy, which he had pursued in the
context of Neapolitan intellectual circles with specific interests in atomistic, materialist, and
evolutionary theories. These circles had been intermittently persecuted by the inquisition and
the Catholic Church. Thirdly, his move enabled him to participate in the process of
secularization, the liberation of political authority from the tutelage of theology, that is. In the
context of this process, numerous intellectuals throughout the European and Mediterranean
worlds wrested the exclusive access to the knowability of the course “nations” run from
absolutist or despotic regimes who routinely claimed their legitimacy on theocratic grounds.
And finally, his strategy allowed him to promote the thesis of the knowability of history on the
basis of scientific principles. What Vico advocated, then, was a methodology which, based on
rational principles, was capable of assessing the past and the present of social systems. Hence it
would be capable of also predicting their future. This methodology claimed the properties of a
true modern science: objectivity, universality, certainty, and predictability. Its truth resided in the
facts: verum-factum convertuntur. Just as Newton’s new science of physics measured motion
and rest in the mechanical worlds, Vico’s new science of society measured motion and rest in the
social worlds. These measurements pertained to the social facts which promote and maintain order rather than disorder in a polity. The purpose of Vico’s new science, one of the founding documents of the modern social sciences, resided in the measuring of collective energies in expansion and contraction. It thus monitored social control.

No doubt, Vico was not the first thinker to reflect on social facts that pattern order and disorder. For one, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the fourteenth century historian, statesman, and jurist in the tradition of the Islamic enlightenment from the Tunisian shore of the Mediterranean, studied the history of dynastic regimes since the inception of Islam. The regions he covered ranged from the Oxus to the Nile, and from the Tigris to the Guadalquivir. He detected patterns of behavior which either added to social cohesion, or participated in its disintegration. In his *Muqaddimah (1377)*, he concluded that ruling groups sustain their power by a sense of solidarity, or *asabiyah*, which unites both rulers and ruled. *Asabiyah*, both a structure of consciousness and a structure of feeling, which via education and socialization assumes the power of a *habitus*, or a spontaneous common sense, obtains as long as the ruling groups refrain from attempting to gain exclusive control over all the sources of power and wealth. However, as soon as the ruling groups gain such exclusive control, conflict breaks out. The old regime will soon be displaced by a new dynastic regime. Order, followed by disorder, produces new order in Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical understanding of the political histories of regions under Muslim majority control. About a century later, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Florentine republican statesman and historian, also studied the role of social facts in patterns of order and disorder. Pondering on the ability of political elites in France and England to unify a territory, establish its borders, centralize its
governing structure, and command it in the name of a religion, language, culture, and nation, he arrived at the conclusion in *The Prince* (1513) that political power stabilizes with the extent of the “consensus” provided by its constituents. More precisely, he contended that since the legitimacy of political power ultimately resides in its command of a military force, those soldiers who believe in or identify with values attached to a territory, language, and culture in the form of a “myth” embody superior military capability as compared to those who are not organized around a “myth.” Hence Machiavelli preferred, as Republican Romans had before him, native militias to foreign mercenaries. This consensus or a set of values, embodied by a particular symbolic system such as the myth of the exceptionality of a nation, culture, religion, economy, and language, can function as a cohesive force. In Machiavelli’s estimation, its presence in Holland, France and England led to the formation of a modern nation state in the sixteenth century, while its absence in Italy prevented it. What Vico, Ibn Khaldun, and Machiavelli then have in common is their study of the social facts that condition the rise and fall of power. Yet whereas Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, as historical witnesses to the decline of their particular princes, primarily reflected on the patterns that produce anarchy, Vico, a historical witness to the rise of the centralized power of the princes in France and England, engaged in the construction of a political science for the purpose of preventing anarchy. In contradistinction to Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, who remained anchored in the past, Vico, at the beginning of the European enlightenment, firmly anchored himself in the present. He shared his contemporaries’s enthusiasm for the power of new scientific methods. Equipped with that power, he set out to discover the *res publicas* that condition not a regressive but a progressive sociality and polity.
II. Truth or Social Justice

As Vico’s project suggest, what defined the social sciences since their inception in the west is their desire to seek legitimacy on the methodological grounds of the natural sciences. By doing so, they also adopted a significant shift in the structure of scientific inquiry. When the natural sciences, at the beginning of modernity, emancipated themselves from natural philosophy by displacing a fear of or an alchemistic infatuation with nature with the desire of its domination, a dynamic interest in the instruments capable of effectively overcoming nature displaced the traditional interest of the natural philosopher in observation, classification, and alchemical experimentation. William Leiss notes: "Science and the mechanical arts (technology) replaced 'nature' as the focal point of the expectations associated with the expanding knowledge and control of natural phenomena."

Just as the natural sciences displaced nature with the instruments as the focal point of knowledge expansion, the social sciences too shifted the focal point of knowledge expansion from a political philosophy that reflected on the perfectibility of political society to a political science that reflected on the perfectibility of political knowledge. This shift in the structure of knowledge production was paradigmatic in many ways and has substantively impacted social and political theory to this day in innumerable ways. Its shift in emphasis from the object of inquiry (nature, culture) to perfectible mechanisms of knowledge (technology) enabled the privileging of technology and methodology, or the search for a true method, over the search for a good society. The interests in the quality of the measurements of social life thus always potentially superseded an interest in the quality of social
life, and the tensions between quantitative and qualitative social scientists reflects the implications of this epistemological move from the object of study to the instruments of the inquiring subject. Moreover, this shift from the object of inquiry to the subject as manager of these perfectible mechanisms of knowledge also produced a series of complications. Historians of science such as Carolyn Merchant have pointed to the ecological implications of this epistemological model, to the ways in which such a model legitimated a pervasively disrespectful, if not exploitative and predatory attitude towards nature. The intellectuals’ promotion of the priority of the subject over the object in knowledge acquisition, central to the modern paradigm, of course constitutes a response to the extraordinary resistance of western centers of religious power to the emancipation of the subject. Religious orthodoxy preferred a model in which the subject was capable of passively receiving the truth about society and nature by way of revelation, or by way of scripture, rather than by actively producing knowledge by its own accounts. In this context, the liberational struggle of the thinking subject of modernity, often identified with Cartesian subjectivity, is a historical product. It signals the triumph of reason over the dogmatism of conservative theology. Yet one can also point to other complications in this trajectory of the modern subject. These pertain to the extraordinary precariousness of a structure of knowledge acquisition based on the rationality of an ideal subject whose purity of consciousness has been severed from the interested logic of body and soul, as well as from the interests of political geography and economic class. Not surprisingly, the most engaged and influential philosophical schools in the west intermittently challenged the modern subject’s rational grounds from the moment it made its appearance in public in the seventeenth
century. The “crisis of reason” was repeatedly declared since the inception of modernity. While the fragmentary character of the modern subject constituted the object of study of Nietzschean philosophy, Freudian psychoanalysis and linguistic nominalism, the fragmentariness of the products of such subjects in the area of knowledge constituted the object of study of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Heideggerian existentialist-phenonemenological philosophy, and the philosophical schools who submitted their systems to the “linguistic turn.” Throughout the twentieth century, the “crisis of reason” had not only been detected by philosophers, however, who pay attention to primary processes of knowledge production and knowledge acquisition. It had also been declared by observers of secondary processes of knowledge production, who pay attention to the organization, distribution, and exchange of knowledge. Karl Popper’s *Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1957), Thomas Kuhn *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1962), and Paul Feyerabend’s *Farewell to Reason* (1987) are cases in point.9

In spite of formidable challenges from the existentialist, psychoanalytic, indeterminate, and nominalist camps, the modern subject of scientific inquiry overall maintained its integral sovereignty. On the whole, the structural shift from the object of study to the subject of knowledge production, and in particular to its instruments -- both conceptual, methodological, and material-- constituted a most durable feature of the western social science project, conservative and critical alike. Yet there is an additional element I would like to mention here. It pertains to the relation of knowledge to power in the social sciences. The question of the relations of knowledge to power, or the political interestedness of knowledge, is not new, of course, for it has been central to western thought since its inception. In western philosophy,
political philosophy always comprised an intrinsic moment not only of the philosophical enterprise, but also of the scientific enterprise. Indeed, science (physics), philosophy (metaphysics) and politics (ethics) not only were derived from a unifying principle but also expected to be unified in their purpose. This relation between science and politics, or the political accountability and legitimation of science, historically has been more obvious to historians and philosophers of science, rather than to historians of philosophy. More precisely, while contemporary scientists with an interest in the history and philosophy of science indicate little reluctance to addressing the connectedness between science and politics in the history of science, contemporary philosophers interested in the history of philosophy tend to overlook this connection. The separation of philosophy from politics was a gradual process, but it intensified with the academic institutionalization of philosophy as a discipline in increasingly democratizing, and bureaucratizing, western nation states. The rise of modern aesthetic theory as an independent branch of knowledge since the eighteenth century, with its penchant for an apolitical and ahistorical conception of the world, is as much a reflection of this gradual separation of political questions from the realm of philosophy as is the intermittent call to interdisciplinary study methods in order to reunite philosophy with politics on the basis of a unifying principle. Overall, though, in the west, since the eighteenth century the social scientist increasingly replaced the political philosopher.

Here, I suggest again that it is useful to view the social sciences not only against the
background of philosophy, but also against the background of the natural sciences. Yet one must also view them in their interrelations with the history of modern academic disciplines and their embeddedness in institutionalized knowledge systems of production, distribution, and reproduction. In general one can state that as the natural sciences, in the purported name of the accumulation of pure knowledge and science, legitimated their progressive disengagement from social and political questions, the social sciences found themselves caught between an always potentially apolitical model of scientific knowledge production on the one hand, and the historical legacy of political philosophy on the other hand. That legacy reminded them of the political interestedness of all knowledge. Most significant in this historical development were the shifts in the sociological location of knowledge. Under conditions of political absolutism, the intellectual generations of political philosophers generally reflected on the relations between knowledge and power in the direct service of a prince, for the purpose of furthering dynastic interests, or in the interests of emerging productive classes, such as the bourgeoisie. Indeed, most of the important thinkers in early modernity offered their services to the needs of the bourgeoisie, a move which severely jeopardized the freedom of most. Bruno, Galileo, Descartes are good examples. The modern generations of social scientists, conservative and critical alike, since the early eighteenth century, would reflect on knowledge and power increasingly under structural conditions that are intrinsic to the modern nation state in the west. Intellectuals produced their work no longer directly at centers of political and military power, but in increasingly complex institutional and bureaucratic structures, such as at academies and universities, the rules and regulations of which, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, followed the dictates of
increasing differentiation. Surely, the needs of the “nation,” as perceived by the political elites of the individual nation states, imposed ideological programs that furthered the cultural and scientific competitiveness of the leading western nations, particularly in the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth. But the inevitable differentiation into systems and subsystems of knowledge sites, of the rise of new disciplines and the disappearance of old, tendentiously complicated-- and complicates-- the relations between knowledge production and power. Karl Mannheim’s notion of a free-floating intellectual, which he devised in the context of a robust sociology of knowledge, captures the empirical dilemma a theory of knowledge and power was up against by the early twentieth century. It had become unclear where precisely the knowledge organizer operated best, when it came to power, and what he/she should do. However, the institutionalization of the social scientist, in state run academies and universities, had taken its course. And to the extent to which the emerging modern universities in the west are not separable from the formation of the modern nation state and its relation to the evolution of capitalism in a colonized world system, issues pertaining to the relations of knowledge to power in the social sciences are impacted not only by the complex and differentiating disciplinary organization of the modern university, but also by their location in institutional structures the funding and management of which are not separable from the overall interests of capitalist hegemony. As heirs to political philosophy, the social sciences continued the project of relating knowledge to power, particularly since the natural sciences purported to abandon and modern philosophy, did abandon reflections of the kind. Yet simultaneously, to the extent to which the social scientists pursued their project within the constraints of discourses and disciplines which structure the
modern institutions in rich mass societies, competing claims to exacting knowledge production about the relation of knowledge to power challenged knowledge production about the actual relation. This preoccupation with competing claims to exacting knowledge is best reflected in the many treatises on the sociological method which most leading sociologists felt compelled to compose at one point during their career. Weber, Durkheim, Gramsci, and the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School all addressed these claims to exacting knowledge and so did one of the more recent observers of these relations, Michel Foucault.

III. Progress and Knowledge

This replacement of the political philosopher by the social scientist, and the gradual disengagement of social science knowledge producers from the centers of political power in the west is again symbolized by Vico. In his *Scienza nuova*, he reflected on the political function of his knowledge. He distinguished the producers of social knowledge from the political group that implemented policies derived from that knowledge. “To be useful to the human race, philosophy must raise and direct weak and fallen man, not rend his nature or abandon him in his corruption,” is one of the general principles of his new science, expressing the social function of knowledge in theological terms. Elsewhere, he abandoned the theological terminology and spoke as a social and political theorist. A social science, or political philosophy, must serve the needs of the community. Hence social scientists, or intellectual elites, should offer perspectives to political elites who decide on their social and political implementation. “The wise men and princes of the commonwealth will be able, through good institutions, laws, and examples, to recall the peoples to their acme or perfect state. The practic of the science that we as philosophers can offer is such
as can be completed within the academies.” While Vico emphasized in this passage the feasibility of the advisory role of academic intellectuals, such as himself, in the political process, he simultaneously depicted the sociological structure of his political environment: the military, the intellectuals, the politicians, and the artisans all cooperate in the maintenance of social order. In this order of governance, and decision making, the landed aristocratic class (military) depends on the cooperation of the class of intellectuals, politicians, and artisans. Since the artisans represented the economic strata whose activities were crucial for the beginning of capitalist manufacture in the Netherlands, England, France, and Germany, in Vico’s Napels of about half a million residents they signaled the important strata of an emerging capitalist bourgeoisie in Italy as well. Many intellectuals, such as Vico, had their roots in these strata. And so increasingly did the political elites. By the end of the eighteenth century, one of the most able ministers of Naples, Tanucci, was not an aristocrat, but a bourgeois. Vico’s typology of the political elites, as illustrated above, is unclear about his understanding of the substantive capitalist forces of his region. He did not include the representatives of the economic elites, the capital investors, the bankers, the merchant capitalist, and the owners of factories and land of emerging industrial and agricultural capitalism. Historical research indicates that transfer of titles and land from aristocracies to non-aristocrats increased considerably in Vico’s region and century. And it is also not clear from his engagement with the work of the leading European intellectuals of the emerging bourgeois cultures of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and nation state capitalism to which extent he understood the relations between the political, juridical, social, institutional, and cultural prerequisites of a rapidly expanding capitalist
economy. What is clear from his dialogue with European intellectuals of his epoch is his understanding of demands of the economically productive social strata for a series of rights in the face of institutional, political, social, and cultural constraints.

As his counterparts in the Netherlands, England, France, and Germany, Vico was concerned with regulating four modern relationship of state power: (1) the relation between the individual and the state (individual rights over group rights, eventually individual provision of education, health, and welfare), (2) the relations between individual and individual (protection of private property by the state), (3) the relations between the state and the individual (restrictions of arbitrary state power), and (4) the relations between the state and the people (sovereignty). When Vico intellectually engaged with the economic liberalism of Locke and Hume, with the imperialist international relations theory of Grotius, with the epistemological liberalism of Descartes and Leibniz, he may not have detected the impact of the powerful owners of the means of production and the controllers of the access to the rules of the trade on the making of the rules that regulate the individual’s relation to the state. But he shared with the leading intellectuals of early modernity his observations of the organization of the demands for extending individual inalienable rights to increasingly larger groups of people, on the inexorability of claiming such rights on the part of non-aristocratic social strata centrally engaged in the organization of economic production and exchange. Vico was alive when England’s bourgeois classes celebrated their glorious revolution in 1688, and his parents had witnessed the uprisings under Masaniello in Naples under Spanish control, the social and political causes of which are
probably not separable from transfers in the colonialist world system. When it came to social change, Vico was quite clear as to its origin and direction. Change originated from below, and not from above. As he wrote in his New Science: The task of the social scientist is not to ignore the energies that emerge from below, but to listen to the claims that arise from below, and participate in pacing the pace of that change. The extent of the usefulness of social science knowledge is linked to the service it provides for social change. For social science has its origin in society itself, and finds its purpose in it, so that social science can strengthen society when it is weak, and guide it in the right direction when it makes mistakes. To the extent to which people respect civil and penal codes which protect private property and the family, intellectuals should participate in the production of an ideology which grounds family and property (family law) not in religious doctrines but on the secular law of a modern polity. And the authority of the state itself could only be measured in terms of its groundedness in the sovereignty of the people. Historical progress, for Vico as for the actors in the formidable capitalist revolutions preceding him in the Netherlands and England and following him in France and Germany, was measured in terms of popular sovereignty and in terms of a juridical system based not on religion but on secular principles.

What I have argued thus far is that the rise of the social sciences in the west is not separable from the institutional, political, and economic developments of capitalism. As sisters to the natural sciences and heirs to political philosophy, social scientists for the past three hundred years either distinguished, to various degrees, their fields of inquiry from the natural
sciences and political philosophy, or identified, equally to various degrees, the goals of their fields with those of these. The epistemological, methodological, and political tensions that obtained between the sciences and ethics by the twentieth century acquired the name of the “two cultures.” As the natural sciences increasingly became disinterested in the social consequences of scientific research and application, the social sciences intermittently pointed to the social consequences of socially disinterested scientific practice. This is to say, although the social sciences since their inception experienced considerable pressure to abandon social, and more particularly, democratic concerns in the name of objectivity, universality, and the neutrality of science, on the whole major social scientists did not give up the notion of the social accountability and responsibility of the social scientist. The terms of the enlightenment, progress, democracy, and human rights patiently courted the sociological imagination. When Karl Marx about one hundred years after Vico’s death pronounced his famous Feuerbach Thesis No 11, history in the form of the French Revolution had suggested to him that active seizures of political state power were not simply contingent on emancipatory social theories. “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it,” wrote Marx, thereby pointing to the secondary function theory fulfilled in his understanding of the dialectical struggle towards authentic democratic freedom for all. However secondary theory’s function in the Marxist framework of history’s inexorable march towards revolutionary freedom, a function it still fulfilled. In fact, Marx’s entire life project focused on the socio-economic analysis of capitalism, on detecting the systemic connections and systematic linkages between the productivity of the producers of commodities on the one hand, and the managers of productivity
and unproductivity on the other hand. It also demystified the fetishism of the intellectual class that produced knowledge about these processes, the political economists. The ideological alliances between producers of social knowledge and the controllers of the access to the management of the organization of social wealth and poverty, which Marx poignantly criticized, should become important arguments in critical social and political theories throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After Marx, an entire range of social theorists revindicated the claim of the social accountability of knowledge. Antonio Gramsci, for one, with his theory of intellectuals, as expounded in the *Southern Question* (1926) and *The Prison Notebooks* (1929-35) reflected on the function of the managers of social justice in the context of the organization of the working class struggle in Italy. And the Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, for another, always attempted, even by way of their most esoteric representatives, such as Theodore Adorno, to forge the relations between capitalist power and resisting knowledge. Similarly, feminist critical theorists since the 1970's throughout the United States and western Europe, poignantly called into question the links between the epistemological assumptions of predominant social science and forms of patriarchal oppression.

IV. South and North

Yet in spite of the self-reflexivity that characterized important critical tendencies in western social science, one thing is certain. Social matters and concerns were not global but mostly regional if not local in nature. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to point to the regionalist and parochialist dimensions of western mainstream social science. The significant analytical
concepts that emerged within its context predominantly measured not a general but a particular social reality: that of western society. Inscribed into concepts, methods, and epistemologies was Europe’s presumed historical significance vis-a-vis the rest of the global regions, as Immanuel Wallerstein notes in his *The End of the World as We Know It. Social Science for the Twenty-First Century.* Concepts, methods, and epistemologies were deemed universalizable. As bi-products of the trajectory of the market economies of industrial capitalism, the cultures of western science and philosophy, however contentious the struggle of its “two cultures,” from the start were based on the premise of the insignificance of knowledge production outside the western purview. Here, by way of example, let me return one more time to Vico. In his *Autobiography* (1729) he representatively mentioned that it was surely no coincidence that he, Vico, had been born in Naples, and not in Morocco. It was no coincidence, he states, that a new science of the nature of nations issued forth in an Italian city, for its purpose resided in adding to the glory of Italy, and not to that of any other place. Hence, the emergence of his new science was tied to a specific place at a specific time. And indeed, Vico’s science originated at a particular historical moment, a moment marked by the consequences of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. With this treaty, powerful European kings publicly tolerated the right of each nation to select a state religion of their choice. Yet the sovereignty which they ascribed to their own territories did not extent to Germany and Italy. With this treaty, they privately insisted on the right of their own unified nation states (Sweden, Austria, France, England and Russia) to maintain the balance of power in Europe by fighting their respective wars on the non-unified territories of Germany and Italy. The domination of Italian territories in particular occasioned an endless tug of war of
Europe’s centers of power until Italy’s unification in the 1870′ies. Vico, born sixteen years after the Peace of Westphalia, and resident of a city that had at the time of his birth experienced uninterrupted foreign rule for hundreds of years, had reason to ponder the substantive conditions of national unity. That his new science dispensed policies for the formation of a sovereign and independent Italian nation state was surely the understanding of many eighteenth century Italian patriotic intellectuals who had read his work. Yet even if that patriotic detail were debatable, one thing is certain. Vico, as practically all western mainstream social scientists has an intellectual and spiritual predilection for western cultural regions exclusively, a predilection which contemporary critics have conceptualized as “eurocentricity.” It is a penchant he indeed shared with many leading figures of the western social science tradition, ranging from Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Gramsci, to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the feminist theorists. For instance, Vico initially engaged in a comparative study of the originary social facts (religion, burial rights, marriage) that produce political cohesion. In his comparative approach, he focused on the history of many societies, such as those of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phenicians, Scythians, Jews, Greeks and Romans. Yet he abandoned his multi-cultural design when he narrowed his approach to the exclusive study of Greece and Rome. Ultimately, although he makes claims to the universality of his science of the nature of nations, his *Scienza nuova* used overwhelming empirical evidence from Greek epic poetry, and, above all, from the history of Roman Republican law. Hence Greek and Roman history normatize the entire Mediterranean region in his conception of the world. In this he foreshadowed, in the early eighteenth century, the predilections of the European intellectual elites of the late eighteenth and
nineteenth century for Greek and Roman antiquity.

Marx, similarly, who surely understood that the law of capitalism entailed an inexorable need, on the one hand, for new markets of cheap labor and goods, and, on the other hand, for the control of access to natural resources, consequently took into account capitalism’s necessity to pursue colonialist and imperialist strategies in order to maintain a competitive edge. His pages on India and Algeria reflect a geographic sensibility of sorts. Ultimately, though, he measured the evolution of capitalism in non-western regions along conceptual lines directly derived from his analysis of capitalist industrial formations in England.24 Weber and Durkheim, who both worked on sociologies of religions, engaged in detailed studies of ethnographic materials and religious documents not only from Europe, but from many global regions. In one of his most substantive volumes, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), Durkheim focused on the totemic systems of Australian tribes.25 Weber’s most central focus of thought lay in a comparative sociology of religion, in the context of which he studied the religions of India, China, the west (protestantism), Islam, and Judaism.26 Hence both of their geographic imaginations extended far beyond the European borders. However, it is important to note that for both of these “fathers of western sociology,” the study of Asia Pacific for one, (Durkheim), or of India and of China, for another (Weber) was ultimately in the interest of more differentiated knowledge production about the past and the future of western societies, and not in the interest of knowledge production about the rest of the world. When the rest of the world figures, it figured along the measurements and norms of western industry, technology, and culture. And more
significantly, as French and German critical sociology increasingly operated under conditions of competitive nationalism in the century of the two world wars, on the whole they closed their shops to African, Latin American, and Asian Studies. The Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, however universalizing their methodologies and conceptualities, primarily dealt with issues pertaining to European history, such as the impact of moral disasters -- world war two and the holocaust -- on modernity’s claim to progress. Or they dealt with issues pertaining to modern society under conditions of advanced capitalism -- consumer society, mass culture, one-dimensionalization of modern psychic structure, instrumental reason, and the like.

French social science, while more astute to institutional life outside European regions due to its colonialist history, in its significant forays into structural anthropology it nonetheless adhered to notions of the “primitive” and the “modern” when purveying social life outside Europe. At times, the “primitive” is elevated to challenging the “modern,” such as in Freud’s notion of a civilizational discontent. Yet Freud’s cultural geography of the soul remains thoroughly European. Even Gramsci, who had more of a sense of the global immanence of anti-colonial movements, adhered to normative principles of industrial productivity unmistakingly rooted in the history of the Western economic systems of industrial capitalism. On the whole, none of the major representatives of western critical social science had traveled much outside Europe and the U.S. Weber had made a trip to the United States, Durkheim had traveled to Germany, and Marx moved between Germany, France, Holland, and England, which represented, apart from the U.S., the core countries of global capitalism. His brief visit to Algeria, late in his life and for reasons of health, had not much impact, if any, on the structure of his theory.
Gramsci visited the Soviet Union in the early 1920's, and members of the Frankfurt School spent years of political exile in the U.S. during and after world war two. Few, if any, had first hand knowledge of the regions beyond Europe and the U.S. There existed profound limits to their geographic imagination. When the U.S., after world war two, reiterated its exclusive global hegemonic hold on the access to the writing of the rules of global trade -- an hegemony that should last from 1918 to 1989, interests in the rest of the world on the part of the European social scientists diminished even further in favor of regionalized, of not localized intellectual engagements. Indeed, until 1989, much of the energies of the significant players of the social science establishment concentrated on definitions of “modernity,” a concept not in a plural but in a singular case, which is designed to grasp and clarify not any modernity but the condition of “modernity” in the social-democracies of western European late capitalism. Giddens, Touraine, Habermas, and Bobbio all responded to that competitive call for clarification. On the whole, western social scientists, whether conservative, liberal, or critical alike, remained resilient to engaging in an understanding of the function of the self-imposed geographic constraints of their knowledge production in geopolitics. Hence the struggle of the so-called “two cultures” in the west between the socially disinterested natural sciences and the socially interested wing of the social sciences was ultimately a struggle impervious to its exclusive rootedness in the west in terms of its origins, purposes, and goals. As such it was profoundly disinterested in the point of view, epistemological and ethical, of the “third cultures,” those of the third world or the south.

That the predominant conception of the world of mainstream western social science
remained eurocentric is a function of many variables and it is not the place here to examine it. Suffice it to say that the educational socialization of western intelligentsias in general, but of the European in particular, is closely linked, over the past hundreds of years, to the formation of the modern state, which is also a national state. To the extent to which the nation state was a necessary institution for the development of industrial capitalism, the class of industrial capitalists insisted on the production of elites, political and intellectual, who functioned as the producers, distributors, and maintenance operators of their respective national cultures. These in turn supported the state and the state supported economic system. The survival needs of the modern political economy extended into the sphere of education and culture. For one, a class based economic production and market system required the systematic production of various strata of citizens, whose variability in skill and life quality expectation was crucial for the maintenance of this class based economy. Extensively stratified systems of education answered to these needs. Since class differences do not lend themselves to social cohesion, political elites resorted to the aid of intellectual elites in order to systematically assuage the differences in status and welfare. Mythologies of origin, commonality, and purpose constructed national cultures, and every generation in Europe was simultaneously raised, via the administratively centralized and socially differential educational system, to national identity and to class consciousness. For the elites of Europe’s economic core countries, the experience of class and nation unambiguously coincided into one. The fact of the economic superiority of class minimized the need for national identity, while economic and social inferiority maximizes it. The production of national identity on the basis of geographic studies, architecture, literature, history, music, and art is the sine qua
non of the European educational system. Europe’s most powerful national cultures, as functions of their respective political economies, competed with each other for generations, in terms of the influence they wished to exert on Europe’s periphery. But that competition also principally involved the access to and control of the legacy of western antiquity. The obsession with that legacy has produced extraordinarily extensive traditions of scholarship, particularly in the nineteenth century. But it has also produced, as Edward Said pointed out, a tradition of scholarship which measures an underdeveloped “orient” along the lines of an industrialized, technologized, democratized and wealthy “occident” without taking into account the relation between “oriental” underdevelopment and “occidental” industrialization. The social sciences in the west, raised in the disciplines and institutions of a complex educational and cultural system in Europe the existence of which stretches back in some instances to about 500 years of bourgeois hegemonic history, were profoundly socialized into the cultural consciousness of Europe’s nations. This past cannot be undone. But a future in the social sciences can be shaped.

V. Social Science in the Network Age

The economic, military, and cultural hegemony of the United States during the cold war period exercised considerable influence on the scientific cultures of Europe. The social science cultures were no exception. The structure of the field of U.S. political science, for instance, grounded in a philosophical model of political realism, was introduced to a variety of European academies, particularly in Italy. European social scientists, while competing with each other for authority and status, were also always engaged with the methods and goals of the “hard wing”
of the U.S. social sciences, with economics, political science, and sociology, that is. While British and German social scientists engaged more directly with U.S. social science as compared to the French, the French social scientists in turn competed with the Germans and the British over intellectual territory in Italy, Spain, and other intellectual regions. This competition for intellectual hegemony extended to other global regions as well, and Brazil’s systematic recourse to French intellectuals in the thirties to build its social science fields -- and to German chemists in order to build their natural sciences, is one of many formidable reminders of the geopolitical facts of academic geography. During the cold war, intrinsic to the dominant U.S. social science project, particularly in sociology and political science, was its tendency to exclusively explore the workings of U.S. society. As a result, the U.S. government, aware of its potentially systemic lack of experts on global regions, encouraged the organization of “Area Studies” at research universities in order to meet its need for international knowledge. More recently, the European Union has copied this model of “Area Studies” in its cultural diplomacy strategy by funding a series of European Studies Programs in the Asia Pacific, South East Asia, the Southern Mediterranean (Cairo, Egypt), and in South Asia (Delhi, India). As European social science continued its dialogue with U.S. counterparts, they witnessed the challenges to predominant social science in the U.S. by a series of powerful social movements, such as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the multicultural rights movement. These have begun to transform the structure of some disciplines, the organization of some divisions in the academy, and hence of the organization of some branches of knowledge production in the U.S. These transformations have been most notably in the area of the humanities and cultural studie,
divisions of limited institutional and social influence, prestige, and power, to be sure, but the extent of the effects of the social movements of the sixties and seventies on the structures of thinking and feeling on U.S. political and intellectual elites has not been adequately studied. As European social science, faced with its own social transformations due to international migration flows, began to profit from multicultural knowledge derived from the U.S., both European and U.S. social science, especially in its “hard wing,” in economics, political science, and sociology, nonetheless remained anchored in a political philosophy of distributive justice that excludes non-US and non-European territories from its distribution of economic justice. The multicultural debates in the U.S. of the eighties, for instance, rarely included systematic discussions on economic cultures that live outside U.S. terrain. The power of the predominant international relations paradigm thus overshadowed the project of critique in the western social sciences.

Perhaps not paradoxically at all -- given the mixture of international talent and first rate indigenous advanced intellectual production that accrues to the U.S. academies, the most powerful institutions of higher education worldwide--the most significant epistemological transformations in the western social sciences have emerged not from Europe, but from the U.S. These have been nurtured particularly by the “soft wing” of US social science. These pertain to cultural anthropology and economic geography, on the one hand, and to studies in interdisciplinary fields that have mostly lived on the periphery of the U.S. academy for many decades, on the other hand. Development Studies, Peace Studies, Ecology Studies etc are cases in point. In spite of its entranced bureaucracies, the U.S. academy has historically demonstrated greater flexibililty in terms of disciplinary innovation as compared to European universities.
While the “soft wing” of the U.S. social sciences, including some of the newly emerging interdisciplinary studies fields, systematically engaged with conceptions of the world that called into question the geopolitical functions of hegemonic western epistemologies and economic ethics, leading interdisciplinary social scientists have recently endeavored to relate the enabling features of the structural changes of western economic society to the rest of the world. The move towards radical self-reflexivity in the western “soft” social sciences, furthered, particularly in the U.S., by profound epistemological shifts derived from the feminisms of the past few decades and the discourses on the nexus between race, gender, and class coincide with a series of significant epistemological developments and shifts on a global scale. What is significant about this coincidence is not the fact of its existence, but the fact of its existence in the context of the constraints and possibilities of the network age. For lack of a better term, I will call this historical possibility of these newly emerging conceptualities in the social sciences the rise of the “fourth culture.” Thereby I wish to distinguish it from the historical notion of the “two cultures,” as explored above, on the one hand, and to signal the inevitable countdown of the peripheral status of the knowledge cultures and centers of knowledge production of the third world, on the other hand. Particularly since 1989, the rise of this fourth culture has increasingly assumed recognizable forms the functions of which have already been measured -- however exploratorily--in a series of empirical studies. The informing elements of this emerging fourth social science culture are many and their respective value and function in its construction must be subject to empirical verification. It can not be done in the context of this essay. I can only briefly address three of its many informing elements in the remainder of this essay. These pertain to (1) the
continuity in the critical epistemological traditions of organic intellectuals of the south; (2) the effects of the dialogue between northern and southern intellectuals on the issue of religion and secularism; and (3) the possibilities of the internet and other new means of communication in bridging information and knowledge gaps between north and south while simultaneously increasing communication and concerted action between anti-consumerist cultural movements in the north and all manner of democratic impulses in the south. By democratic I understand the desire of groups and communities to organize their control over the forces that shape their lives.

(1) First, with the advent of the major independence movements of the former colonies since the end of World War Two, organic intellectuals from developing countries have elaborated—against the pressures of elites at home and abroad who subscribe to the model of western modernity—critical traditions which problematize the claims of universality inscribed in western social science. Among these critical intellectuals are Frantz Fanon, Paulo Freire, Samir Amin, Ashis Nandy, Aziz al-Azmeh, Amartya Sen, Vandana Shiva and many others. Whether one agrees with their point of view or not, their work is rooted in a consciousness that reflects the difference of their social realities from those of the institutional trajectory of western society. Since these intellectuals have called for the scientific study of their realities for the economic, social, and political benefit of their society, they all have, on their own terms, addressed the issue of cultural difference. Against the background of these models of cultural differentiation, new generations of social scientists can and have more effectively explored the institutional difficulties developing countries experience as part of a globalized, networked, and informational world system. In other words, for over fifty years third world intellectuals and first world
intellectuals who have, as much as that is possible, tried to understand the third world point of view, have patiently assembled elements for a social science that is relevant to the actual development of their society and region. A recent publication entitled “Thai Studies,” in which a series of social scientists examine Thai society from a historiographical, anthropological, and cultural perspective, is a good example.

(2) The second element is intrinsically linked to the rise of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world, developing and developed alike. In the developing world or the south, particularly in regions of Muslim majority countries, attempts at forging a social science, and hence potentially social policies that combine traditional religious doctrines with the needs of nations in a network of global shifts and transformations have produced a series of effects. Many of them are not positive from the point of view of human rights, democratic institutions, and enlightened legacies. What is important here is that the rise of religious fundamentalism in Muslim majority countries, known by the name of Islamism, has also had an impact on Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, who since the early nineties have increasingly made organized claims to specific cultural rights. These include the right to symbolic materiality, such as the building of mosques, cemeteries, and the funding of the training of clergy. As a result, leading public intellectuals in the west have met this challenge by taking recourse to western philosophical traditions, which, equipped with the concepts of human rights, equality, democracy, progress, and freedom, adhere to the tradition of secularism. Thereby they tend to bypass the problematic of religion. Yet for critical Afro-Asian intellectuals who live and work in
cultures and societies that experience the political impact of religious doctrines if not orthodoxy and dogmatism, bypassing religion is not an easily available option. Thus one of the unintended consequences of religious fundamentalism has been the recognized need for a systematic dialogue between southern and northern intellectuals, particularly on the issue of religion, ideology, and culture. For the past twenty years, intellectuals such as Mona Abousenna and Mourad Wahba (Cairo, Egypt) have indefatigably fostered discussion on the clashes between western political philosophies and religious fundamentalism. Similarly, Ashis Nandy has worked for many decades from within his Institute for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, India to engage northern intellectuals with southern realities. By necessity, dialogues that obtain cannot circumvent the haunting effects of colonialism long after its abolition, the continuing disenfranchisement of third world countries from wresting the dictate of the rules of their trade from outsiders, and on the inexorable logic of an economic system, such as capitalism, that ever more pits a democratic ethics of equal opportunity against the geopolitical reality of profoundly unequal life chances. Most importantly, the struggle to diminish global inequality has turned into a struggle between moral authorities whose variable recourse to religious symbols in the production and management of a national consciousness reflects the difficulty, or perhaps the impossibility, of producing a modern, secular, enfranchised, and literate society within a few decades.

(3) Thirdly, the information technology revolution, which drives a networked and globalized economy as it is driven by it, has begun to operate a fundamental hegemonic shift not yet significantly in knowledge production, but in knowledge acquisition and knowledge
application. Access to the web, as observers of globalization point out, connects capital flows, investments, and currency speculation for those who command capital, investments, and currencies. But access to the web also connects flows of knowledge, information, and advise throughout the world potentially capable of participating in the charting of more equitable and sustainable futures for generations to come. As anti-consumerist organizations on a global scale link up with political groups, social movements, cultural institutions and all manner of organized practices designed to oppose old and new forms of exploitation of the third world on a global scale, an enabling element of the fourth culture arises. It is a condition of a possibility of upholding of what Gramsci called the “good sense.” In all regions of the world, be it in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, organic intellectuals participate in pacing the pace of the practices of “good sense.” These consist in wrestling, via experience and reflection, the natural law of “common sense,” and turn it into the natural law of “good sense,” a sense that spontaneously, on the level of thinking and feeling, abandons the moral law and order of inequality. Yet the condition of possibility of a fourth culture in the social sciences is not simply dependent on the continued work of organic intellectuals of the south to remind us, intellectuals of the north, of the contingencies of location and history when crafting democratic transformations. Indeed, as the globalization debates bring home, there is no unified global theory of progress. The most promising conditions of possibility of the fourth culture resides in the fact of unprecedented means of communication in the emerging network age. The fourth culture in the social sciences both enables and is the product of these new conditions of communicability. Its promise, in the midst of the globalization of cultures and the cultures of
globalization, is irrevocable.


2. In his De antiquissima italorum sapientiae, on the "Most Ancient Wisdoms of the Italians," published in 1710, (Vico, Opere Filosofiche, ed. Nicola Badaloni, Florence: Sansoni, 1971. Pp. 57-168) Vico promoted the search of a foundational principle capable of unifying all the sciences. This treatise, often referred to as Vico's Liber metaphysicus, announces the structure of three proposed books: on metaphysics, on physics, and on moral philosophy or ethics respectively. From the order of this program it is clear that metaphysics, or an ontology, would precede in importance his study of nature on the one hand, and his study of society on the other hand. Structural similarities with Kant's three critiques have been addressed in the scholarship. See in particular Stephan Otto's introduction to Giambattista Vico, Liber metaphysicus. Risposte (eds and trs) Stephan Otto and Helmut Viechtlbauer (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1979) pp.7-20.


4. Among Islamic intellectuals who have discussed the problematic between theology and politics -- albeit in the form of a theory of the differences between the active and the human intellect-- are Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. Possibly under the influence of their philosophy, Marsiglio di Padova wrote his famous Defensor Pacis (1325) in which the power of
the state resides in the sovereignty of the people. This text turned out to be considered one of the most heretical texts in the western tradition. Dante’s *De Monarchia* (1310) also reflects the preoccupation of intellectuals at the beginning of modernity with the separation of political from religious authority.


7. See his *Domination of Nature*: "Science and the mechanical arts (technology) replaced 'nature' as the focal point of the expectations associated with the expanding knowledge and control of natural phenomena. (New York: George Braziller, 1972) p. 76.

8."In investigating the roots of our current environmental dilemma and its connections to science, technology, and the economy, we must reexamine the formation of a world view and a science that, by reconceptualizing reality as a machine rather than a living organism, sanctioned the domination of both nature and women. The contributions of such founding "fathers" of modern science as Francis Bacon, William Harvey, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Isaac Newton must be reevaluated. The fate of other options, alternative philosophies, and social groups shaped by the organic world view and resistant to the growing exploitative mentality needs reappraisal." *The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980) p. xvii.


11. Immanuel Wallerstein, in his *The End of the World as We Know It. Social Science for the Twenty-First Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) emphasizes the link between western industrial capitalism and the rise of the social sciences.

12. The systematic link between defense industry, let us say, or the production of profitable goods/services and the science divisions of research university in modern nation states simply
exists. But as Manuel Castells and Peter Hall have demonstrated in their *Technopoles of the World. The making of 21st Century Industrial Complexes* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), the most important sites of new knowledge production and the transformation of this knowledge into the production of commodities and or the profitable organization of services develop not in universities or because of their link to universities. Rather, the link to universities is only one of the many variables -- and surely not the most important one -- that construct a powerful site of research and development of new knowledge. As far as modern philosophy is concerned in the west, with its institutionalization in the university its mainstream has been relegated to teaching the history of western philosophy on the one hand (mostly in Europe), or to proving its knowledge production relevance by participating in questions of the cognitive sciences on the other hand (mostly U.S.A).


I


19. Most notable theoretically were the standpoint theorists, among them Dorothy Smith, Nancy Hartsock, and more recently, Patricia Hill Collins.


gloria della patria e in conseguenza dell’Italia, perché quivi nato e non in Marocco esso riusci letterato, .....”

22. One of the most important Vico scholars, Nicola Badaloni, has made this point on many occasions. See his Antonio Conti. *Un abate libero pensatore tra Newton e Voltaire* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1968).

23. Actually, as it turns out, although he includes Hebrew civilization in his tables, he will not submit it to comparative study, as Martin Bernal has pointedly noted: *Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, 2 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1987), vol. 1, p. 170.

24. See *The Marx-Engels Reader*, pp. 659-664, for a brief discussion on imperialism in India.


27. I would like to thank my colleague Dr. Zouaoui Beghoura, from the University of Mentouri in Constantine, Algeria, for alerting me to Marx’s Algerian days. For Marx’s letters from Algiers see Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels. *Werke*. Vol. 35 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1979): 43-60.

28. Jung is an exception. He traveled to India and visited native Indian communities in the United States in order to satisfy his anthropological interests.


30. I owe this detail to Jose Arthur Giannotti, Director, Cebrap (Centro Brasileiro de Analisi e Planejamento, Sao Paulo, Brazil.

31. See Renate Holub, “European Studies in Asia.” http://www.learning.berkeley.edu/holub. In any event, the organized practice of powerful nations to fund intellectual elites from economically dependent countries for temporary study at research universities is well established in the core countries of Europe and its long time effects for both funders and recipients have not been studied yet very carefully in any systematic way. Frantz Fanon has written powerfully pages on this issue in his *Black Sind, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press, 1967. The U.S. has
historically handled this transaction differently. As a classical immigration country, it has welcomed the transfer of talent to its academies, a phenomenon which is now called “Brain Drain.”

32. When the Clinton administration seized its legitimate power, one of the president’s economic advisors, Laura d’Andrea Tyson compared the organization of economic skill production of the U.S. and Germany. Ensuing analyses arrived at the conclusion that Germany’s productive forces are enhanced by the excellence of its school systems up to the level of graduate studies, whereas the excellence of U.S. graduate schools, up to then unequalled worldwide, enhanced the excellence of the managers of high level skill production.


